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THE SUMMARY POWER TO PUNISH FOR
CONTEMPT
In the past three quarters of a century there have been many signs
that the power to punish summarily for contempt of court is encroaching
upon the once sacred "right" of trial by jury in criminal cases :-e.g.,
summary punishments for crimes affecting receiverships;1 the labor
injunction, which, though it is a main subject of my interest, will re-
ceive only casual further mention here; various other instances where,
in form, the question is rather as to scope of chancery power to enjoin
than as to the scope of the contempt power;la and finally a small but
growing class of cases, of which the Sinclair case, 2 discussed later in
this article, is an extreme instance, in which the question of summary
punishment for crime is unconfused with that of equity jurisdiction.
Trial by jury was an important egg in the setting from which de-
mocracy was hatched. And its decline is cumulative of much other
evidence that democracy itself is in decline. That may be neither
preventible nor evil; the place for what is worn out is the scrap-heali.
It is possible that values that were well served by democracy and the
jury system in" their prime may now be served better otherwise. But
the devious and obscure processes of social change involve danger
that real values may be sacrificed without our knowing it. Unsat-
isfactory though trial by jury has become, it does not follow that
trial by a judge who is not directly checked by unprofessional com-
mon sense and common feeling is necessarily better. Answer to the
question of how criminal justice may become efficient involves vastly
more than easy choice between those two alternatives. For satisfactory
answer, that question must be clearly faced. This paper is motived
by a hope of contributing indirectly to that end, by stamping for what
it is one of the red herrings-the punitive use of the contempt power-
which confuse the scent of the true question. A view of the reason-
' Which I have lately considered in an appendix to A Strike and Its Legal
Consequences-An Examination, of the Receivership Precedent for the Labor In-junction (1931) 40 YAZ L. J. 507, 534 et seq.
" To a consideration of that question this paper is preliminary. Since it went
to press I have had the privilege of reading in manuscript an interesting article by
Professor Harmon Caldwell, to appear in the ILLxIois LAw REviEW during the fall
of 1931, on Injunctions to Prevent Crime.
"The Minnesota statute authorizing injunctive prohibition of the publication
of defamatory newspapers was held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of
the United States in Near v. State of Minnesota, U. S. Daily June 2, 1931, re-
versing State v. Guilford, infra note 36."
'Sinclair v. United States, 279 U. S. 749, 49 Sup. Ct. 471 (1929).
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able scope of the contempt power which is orthodox, at least in the ab-
stract, is presented, and judicial inconsistencies therewith are deplored.
For encroachments upon jury trial3 by perversion of the contempt
power tend rather to evasion than solution of the problem of efficient
criminal justice.
I. THE THEORY OF THE SUMMARY POWER
Criminal proceedings, said Blackstone, "are divisible into two
kinds: summary and regular." The institution of summary proceed-
ings is principally legislative; "for the common law is a stranger to it,
unless in the case of- contempts." In other cases he found that it had
"of late been so far extended, as if a check be not timely given, to
threaten the disuse of our admirable and truly English trial by jury";
the danger of arbitrary power outweighed, he thought, the benefit of
speedy but erratic justice. The summary and inquisitorial procedure
for contempt, however, though "not agreeable to the genius of the
common law in any other instance," seemed to him to result "from the
first principles of judicial establishments." And he concluded (in-
correctly, as modern scholarship has shown) that it had been used
immemorially and was confirmed by Magna Carta as part of the law
of the land.4
Whatever the date and legitimacy of its birth, the summary pro-
cedure for contempt is an old exception to the principle that trial by
jury is essential to due process of law. Since the exception is in deroga-
tion of the principle, it would be natural to find its limits both closely
and clearly defined. The contrary, however, is the case. "Contempt of
court (which has been irreverently termed a 'legal thumb-screw') is so
manifold in its aspects that it is difficult to lay down any exact definition
of the offense." The most autocratic of judicial powers is likewise
in practice the most indefinite.
Its vagueness is accounted for by the fact that the law of contempt,
unlike our judge-made law in general, develops in large measure (1)
in cases where exasperation tends to cloud judgment, and (2) in cases
which are virtually e.x parte. Rules declared in great cases of the first
class have frequently, though untraceably, started in petty cases of
the second. In petty cases the alleged contemnor is ordinarily guilty
of some misconduct. He has no great stake in establishing that his
misconduct is not technically contempt, or punishable summarily. His
'Dean Wigmore in A Program for the Trial of Jhry Trial (1929) 12 J. Am.
JuD. Soc. 166, suggests that most of the faults of jury trial as we now have it
are remediable.
4 BL. Com. 280-8. For contrary conclusions based upon historical evidence
instead of assumption, see Sm JoHN Fox, CONTEMPr OF COURT (1927).
'OsWALD, CONTEMPT OF COURT (3d ed. 1911) 5.
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safest and most economical course, even if his conduct was in truth
rightful, is to placate wrath by apology and submission. For should
he assert either a substantive right to his behavior or an adjective right
to ordinary criminal procedure, he faces these probabilities: that his
contention will be overruled; that his obstreperousness will spoil his
chance to escape with a reprimand or a nominal fine; that the expense
of an appeal will be prohibitive.6 If his offense is gross, moreover,
his success in maintaining that it is not summarily punishable may result
only in his exposure to more substantial expense, punishment and
stigmatization in a prosecution by indictment. Unless, as rarely happens
except in cases of contempt by publication, he i. concerned to vindicate
a principle, the game of litigious disputation will usually seem not to
be worth the candle. Neither issues of principle nor enormities of
conduct conduce to judicial detachment. It is natural, therefore, that
the "process of inclusion and exclusion," however it may have clarified
the law of other subjects, has had a contrary tendency in the law of con-
tempt. The limits of principles and precedents are rarely subjected to
searching examination. The authority of sweeping dicta is rarely suc-
cessfully challenged. And facile reliance upon superficial analogies also
contributes to extensions of the summary power which are at variance
with the principles upon which it relies for justification.
What are those principles?
The amplitude of the crime of contempt-not, however, the anpli-
tude of the summary power-dates from antiquity. The writ of attach-
ment for contempt still, in England, describes the contempt, not as
against the court, but as against the King. Originally, probably, what-
ever was lbse majest6 was contempt, and the range was all the way from
treason to a breach of decorum. 7  The administration of justice was
protected not merely because it was the administration of justice but
because the judges were vice-roys; they "sit in the Seat of King
concerning his Justice." s Even today the feeling that injured judicial
majesty is per se entitled to vindication through punishment for con-
'In England indeed findings of so-called criminal contempt are still not ap-
pealable. Ibid. 229. Their general (not yet universal) appealability in this country
is rather recent. See, e.g., Bessette v. Conkey Co., 194 U. S. 324, 24 Sup. Ct. 665
(1904). The long effort to use habeas corpus as a substitute for appeal in con-
tempt cases may have ended with Craig v. Hecht, 263 U. S. 255, 44 Sup. Ct. 103
(1923) ; but see infra note 50.
, Blackstone's chapter "Of Misprisions and Contempts" (4 Comm. c. 9) deals
with crimes which were never summarily punishable, and are no longer thought of
as "contempts." BRAcTON, DE LEGIBUS (13th century) i, 7, indicates a much wider
scope: "there is no greater crime than contempt and disobedience, for all persons
within the realm ought to be obedient to the King and within his peace."
'The King v. Almon (1765), WILmoT, NoTEs AND OPINIONS OF JUDGMENTS
(1802), 243, 255. "The Principle upon which Attachments are granted, in respect
of Bailiffs, is to facilitate the execution of the Law. . . But the Principle upon
which Attachments issue for Libels upon Courts is of a more enlarged and im-portant nature,--it is to keep a blaze of Glory around them." Ibid. at 270.
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tempt of it is not entirely extinct. Its power cannot be doubted by
anyone who has taken the trouble to look beneath the sometimes trans-
parent surface of a considerable number of cases of contempt by publi-
cation.9 But justification of the contempt power as a prerogative of
majesty has become rather quaint than cogent. Moreover, in the days
of monarchy by divine right, when injured majesty was a sufficient and
respectable test of the crime of contempt, it was not a ground for
dispensing with ordinary criminal procedure. Except in the Star
Chamber, contempts were in general like other crimes, tried by jury,
"according to the course of the common law."' 0
The exception of contempt from the ordinary requirements of due
process of law was established not in antiquity, but in the period of
dawning democracy and the rights of man, when it was incumbent upon
courts to adduce for it a pragmatic sanction." This was done thus:
"Laws without a competent authority to secure their administration
from disobedience and contempt would be vain and nugatory. A power
therefore in the supreme courts of justice to suppress such contempts,
by an immediate attachment of the offender, results from the first
principles of judicial establishments, and must be an inseparable at-
tendant of every superior tribunal."' 2 We now, changing words only,
say that the summary power is inherent, arising from the courts' neces-
sity of self-preservation, or of preventing obstruction of their due
administration of justice' 13
'Collected in Nelles and King, Contempt by Publication (1928) 28 COLUMBIA
LAW REv. 401 & 525. Weldon v. State, 150 Ark. 407, 234 S. IV. 466 (1921), is
instructive as well as amusing. A judge before whom an indictment for bootleg-
ging was pending, encountering the defendant at a bathing resort, spoke insultingly
to him, and was insulted in return; the latter insult was held to be, not an "out-
door matter," but a contempt of court.
"Fox, op. cit. supra note 4, 44-55. It was early held that when the contempt
was committed in facie curiae "the view supplied a conviction"; and confession,
perhaps not always voluntary, often did so likewise. But even contempts in facie
were often tried by jury. Ibid. at 227-242. The more enormous the contempt, the
more reason for jury trial. "Richardson Ch. Just. de C. Banc al Assizes at Salis-
bury in Summer 1631 fuit assault per prisoner la condemne pur felony; que puis
son condemnation ject un brickbat a le dit Justice, que narrowly mist; et pur ceo
immediately fuit indictment drawn per Noy envers le prisoner et son dexter manus
ampute & affix al gibbet, sur que luy mesme immediatement hange in presence de
Court." Dyer (Eliz.) 188b, note. Only the amputation was upon the conviction byjury for the contempt; the hanging was for the antecedent felony.
""Who," said Lord Ellenborough in Carr v. Hood, 1 Camp. 350 n. (1808),
"would have bought the works of Sir Robert Filmer after he had been refuted by
Mr. Locke?" With the "refutation" of the doctrine of Divine Right the argument
that the common law courts possessed the summary power as heirs of the Star
Chamber (see Fox, op. cit. supra note 4, 86 et seq.) became an anachronism.
"4 BL. Coam. 486.
"E.g., E.v parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75, 94 (U. S. 1807) ; Cartwright's case,
114 Mass. 230 (1873) ; Carter v. Comm., 96 Va. 791, 32 S. E. 780 (1899).; Bessette
v. Conkey Co., supra note 6. "The accumulated weight of repetition" behind this
formula of the inerent necessity of the contempt power "is a constant invitation
to think words instead of things." Frankfurter and Landis, Power of Congress
over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in "Inferior" Federal Courts (1924) 37
HARv. L. Rrv. 1010, 1022-3.
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Though necessity is strait, it would be captious to insist that prac-
ticality may not construe it somewhat liberally. Loose claims of "neces-
sity" may be made, however, to justify almost anything. "Not one of
the oppressive prerogatives of which the crown has been successively
stripped, in England, but was in its day defended on the plea of neces-
sity."'1 4 The word "necessary"--at least when it is not a constitution
that we are construing 5-must reasonably mean more than "doubtfully
desirable." It will here be used as meaning "highly expedient." It is
"necessary" in this sense that the summary power should be ample.
But its amplitude "is a command never to exert it where it is not neces-
sary or proper."' 6 "Its great and only purpose is to secure judicial
authority from obstruction in the performance of its duties."17 It
does not extend to effecting justice; trial by jury is the procedure
normally prescribed for that often unattainable object. "There is a
difference between obstructing justice and obstructing the administra-
tion of justice. . . . The administration of justice means the perform-
ance of acts and duties required by law in the discharge of duty."' 8
Though there is of course a penumbra as well as a distinction between
justice and its administration, the mechanical rather than the substan-
tive is the domain of the contempt power. It may be used whenever
necessary for the due operation of the judicial machine-at least when
there is no paramount expediency that it should not be. But neces-
sity gives rise only to "the least possible power adequate to the end
proposed."' 9 The power properly exists only when its exercise is
necessary.
That such are the principles of the contempt power is copiously as-
serted and never denied. In particular cases, however, assertion of
the necessity of the power in the abstract is often put to service as a
substitute for demonstration of the necessity of its exercise in the cir-
cumstances before the court.
II. THE VARIETIES OF SUMMARILY PUNISHABLE CONTEMPT
AND THE OBJECTS OF PUNISHMENT
The phrase "varieties of summarily punishable contempt" does
not here refer to the conventional classification of contempts as "civil"
and "criminal." Few legal distinctions are emptier than that-except
"1 Compi.E' WORKS OF EDWARD LIVINGSTON ON CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE
(ed. 1873) 264.
"Cf. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. 1819).
" Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418, 451, 31 Sup. Ct. 492,
502 (1911).
' Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U. S. 378, 383, 39 Sup. Ct. 337 339 (1919).
Hough, J., in Rosner v. United States, 10 F. (2d) 675 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926).
" Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 227 (U. S. 1821). Cf. Brandeis, I.,
dissenting in Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 247, 47 Sup. Ct. 21, 66 (1926).
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of procedural technicality. The point to be made is that in summary
proceedings, in the light of the principles of the power, the criminality
of a serious contempt is almost completely irrelevant. The relevant
questions are these: Is it possible in the particular instance to prevent,
abate, or cure an obstruction of the administration of justice? If so,
what is the least that will effect that end?
It may, however, be desirable to pause upon the conventional
classification long enough to emphasize its misleading tendency. "Civil"
contempt is defined as misconduct by which the rights or remedies of
a party . . . may be . . . prejudiced." 20  The proceeding is on behalf
of an injured litigant. The remedy is to require the contemnor to desist
(usually from disobedience of an injunction, or interference with prop-
erty impounded pendente lite), or to make good the complainant's dam-
age from his violation of a duty imposed upon him by an order in a
case in litigation.21  Subject to statutory limitations, the contemnor,
if able to comply with the remedial requirement, may be committed until
he does so. It is in effect a civil levy of execution which may include
body execution. But I venture to say that every "civil" contempt
whose contumacy is carried to the point at which the contemnor may
be committed is a "criminal" contempt as well-and further, that the
difference in form between summary proceedings in the interest of a
private litigant and summary "criminal" proceedings in the public in-
terest in correcting obstruction of the administration of justice has
contributed to bring about substantial differences in object and re-
sult where there should logically be none.
In the Gompers case,22 for instance, the salient fact was that a
judge summarily imposed severe criminal punishments (six to twelve
months' imprisonment) for an act which the defendants honestly, and
perhaps at that time not unreasonably, believed that they had a legal
right to do.23  They had published that the Bucks Stove and Range
-' The statutory definition in New York and many other states; see Nelles
and King, op. cit. supra note 9, at 421 & 554; Fox, supra note 4, at 44; Beale,
Contempt of Court, Civil and Criminal (1908) 21 HAgv. L. REv. 161; Gompers
case, supra note 16.
'See cases cited in A Strike, etc., supra note 1, at 543-4.
'Supra note 16.
' A man's honest mistake, ignorance, or inadvertance as to his legal duty
does not, of course, relieve him from performance of it. But the normal pro-
cedure is not to punish him forthwith, but to admonish him to correct his der-
eliction. Only when his disregard of admonition makes his contumacy certain
does it become necessary to resort to punitive coercion. Skip v. Harwood, 3
Atk. 564 (1747) ; cases cited in OSWALD, supra note 5, 102-3. The English usage
is to order that an attachment for contempt "lie in the office," to issue only if
the dereliction is .not corrected. Disobedience of an order might well sometimes
lead rather to its reconsideration than to punishment; in Levenstein v. E. I. Du
Pont de Nemours Co., 258 Fed. 662 (D. Del., 1919) a defendant was punished for
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Company was "unfair" to organized labor in spite of an injunction for-
bidding them to do so. The necessity of enforcing the injunction (as-
suming its validity, that being a type of question which this paper
avoids) surely did not require heavy penalties for its violation. The
reversal, however, was not upon the ground that the clearly punitive
sentences were not within the summary power. It was on the narrower
ground that they were unauthorized because the proceeding was, in
form, for a "civil" contempt. The defendants were thereafter re-
sentenced in a new proceeding (prosecuted by the same counsel) in
form for "criminal" contempt.24  This conviction was reversed upon
the ground that prosecution had been outlawed by, or by the policy of,
the criminal statute of limitations.25 Though the opinion of the court
somewhat intimated that prosecution by indictment would be prefer-
able to summary proceedings when the object is punitive, it did not
hold that castigation in a timely summary proceeding for "criminal"
contempt would be improper. It tended, therefore, on the whole to
confirm the supposition that the criminality of contempts may be sum-
marily dealt with.
refusing on advice of counsel to testify pursuant to a commission which was
later held invalid. Ibid. 667 & 991 (D. Mass. 1919).
Statements that contempt "does not depend upon the intention of the party,
but upon the act which he has done" usually mean only that when the circum-
stances are such that no inference save that of his wilful contumacy is reasonably
possible, no attention will be paid to the contemnor's quibbling as to the precise
state of his mind and feelings; the much quoted language of Taney, C. r., in
Wartman v. Wartman, 29 Fed. Cas. No. 17,210 (C. C. D. Md. 1853), should be
,read in the light of the facts of the case. In corporation cases, if the ancient
metaphysic be insisted upon, such circumstances as would prevent regard for a
natural person's denial of contumacy will establish the contumacy of the ar-
tificial mind of the artificial being. Stancomb v. Trowbridge Urban District
Counsel, L. R. (1910) 2 Ch. 190; Spokes v. Banbury Board of Health, L. R. 1
Eq. 42 (1865).
A non-contumacious obstruction of the administration of justice becomes
contumacious upon the obstructor's disregard of an order to correct it. But until
his contumacy has become actual, there can be no necessity for summary punitive
measures. Ex parte Page, 17 Ves. Jr. 59 (1810). The West Virginia court
which fined tardy counsel for delaying a trial in spite of the fact that
their lateness was due to an automobile accident will scarcely be felt to have
made a binding precedent. To punish the persons who destroyed a subject
matter in the belief that a decision of the Supreme Court had terminated litiga-
tion respecting it-a belief mistaken only in that the possibility of re-hearing was
still open-would have been similarly outrageous. Merrimack River Savings
Bank v. City of Clay Center, 219 U. S. 527, 31 Sup. Ct. 295 (1911). Cf. United
States v. Shipp, infra note 58.
'The former severe sentences were re-imposed below. The intermediate
appellate court, after citing authority for the principle that even in "criminal"
contempt proceedings the object was but to secure present and future com-
pliance with the injunction, not, as in "regular" criminal proceedings, punitive,
reduced the sentences to one month in the case of Gompers and fines for his
co-defendants. Yet the injunction, compliance with which was to be secured,
had fallen with the settlement of the suit in which it had issued] In re Gompers,
40 App. D. C. 293, 335-6 (1913).
' Gompers v. United States, 233 U. S. 604, 34 Sup. Ct. 693 (1914).
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It is true both logically and historically that criminal contempt is
a crime of the same general nature and punishable with the same ob-
jects as other crimes. As such a crime it is, both logically and historically,
prosecutable by ordinary criminal procedure. But the habit and neces-
sity of looking to criminal codes for definitions of crimes so prosecutable
has led to forgetfulness of the fact that many of these crimes are con-
tempts. We tend to apply that word only to things dealt with sum-
marily. And since contemlts (1) are criminal and (2) are dealt with
summarily, it has seemed to follow that the criminality of contempts may
always be dealt with summarily. Yet this is rather rarely done in fact.
Courts punish for contempt sparingly. Their main use of the power
is an in, terrorem use-preventive, not punitive; and on the rare occa-
sions when something that looks like a moderate punishment is sum-
marily imposed, the remedial or preventive aspect usually outweighs the
punitive. And in the still rarer instances of clearly punitive summary
sentences for serious contempts, the qualms of disinterested observers
are strong evidence of the occurrence of an abnormality approaching
enormity.
When the mind disabuses itself of the specious non sequitur that
the criminality of contempts may be summarily dealt with because con-
tempts are (1) criminal and (2) subjects of summary abatement, and
recurs to the principles of the summary power for definition of its
limits, such qualms turn out to be as well founded logically as they are
in feeling. Edward Livingston made in 1824: a statement of the limits
implicit in the principles and policy of the power whose clarity resists
improvement:
"A recurrence to the great principle of self-defence will serve to show
with some certainty to what extent this power is necessary or proper. Courts
are, or ought to be, armed with every power necessary to defend themselves.
Noise, interruptions, violence of every kind, must be repressed; obedience to
all lawful orders must be enforced. Thus far the law of self-defence goes,
but no further. Is the violence over-has the interruption ceased-is the in-
truder removed-has the order which was disobeyed been complied with?-
here the power of the incorporeal being [i.e., the court], as well as that of
the individuals in the analagous cases, ceases, and the duty of the sovereign
power begins. That alone must punish-that alone can define offences and
fix the penalty for committing them. An infringement of the legal rights
of a court of justice is an offence, and that government is radically defective
which places the power to punish it in the hands of the offended party. Here,
then, we find the limit of that necessity, which is so much insisted on and
so little understood. There is a necessity that courts should have the power
of removing interruptions to their proceedings, but there is none that they
should have the power to punish those interruptions; the laws must do that,
by the instrumentality of the courts, but in the form prescribed by law.
HeinOnline  -- 31 Colum. L. Rev.  963 1931
-COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
"If the argument has been as clearly expressed as its force is felt, it
must be convincing to show that courts ought to be empowered to remove
all obstructions to their proceedings; that all such acts should be punished
only by the due course of law; and that proper punishments, inflicted by the
regular operation of law, will deter from these acts much more effectually
than the irregular agency of the offended party, who sometimes, from
delicacy, will abstain from enforcing the penalty of the law-sometimes,
from the indulgence of passion, will exceed it.""
Livingston's proposed Penal Code for Louisiana would have al-
lowed no summary punishment whatsoever; even for petty disturbance
in the court room the limit of summary power would have been to hold
the offender long enough to turn him over for regular criminal prosecu-
tion.2 7 So drastic a limitation of the summary power by so strict a con-
ception of the necessity which justifies it would, though logical, be unde-
sirable. Petty offenders are apt to enjoy cqmplete immunity unless
they can be summarily punished. The efficiency of various non-judicial
autocracies which have been found highly expedient-those, for instance,
of the commander of an army, the master of a ship at sea, and the
traffic policeman-requires various degrees of punitive discretion. Temp-
ering strict necessity with practicality, it would seem that the following
varieties of contempt may well be subject to some degree of summary
punishment:
1. Misconduct by officers of court in their official transactions. The
court, like the general of an army, must maintain discipline among sub-
ordinates. This is perhaps the oldest head of punitive summary power.
Except with respect to attorneys, as to whose discipline there has grown
up a distinct and satisfactory body of law and practice, its use is mainly
in terrorem. It rarely encroaches upon the domain of ordinary criminal
proceedings. It seems appropriate that an embezzling receiver should
be committed until he makes good his defalcations, if he is able. But
should his criminal punishment be imposed in a summary proceeding ?28
2. Petty disturbances in or about the judicial precincts. An efficient
in terrorem power to maintain order and decorum must have teeth.
Peccadilloes too trifling to be worth the bother of sending to another
court for prosecution should not for that reason be committed with im-
punity. As to such matters the court may appropriately resolve itself
momentarily into a petty criminal court. But its punitive power, like that
LvINGSTON, supra note 14, at 264-6. The quoted passage has been much
abridged without indication of the omissions.
2 ibid., 59-60; CoDI, Book ii, tit. v, ch. xi, arts. 205-8.
This was done in Cartwright's case, supra note 13.
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of a justice of the peace, is a little power to deal with little things.29
The angry defeated litigant who threw an egg at Vice Chancellor Sir
Richard Malins in 1877 was summarily committed and, after five
months' imprisonment, deported.30 Should he not rather, like the felon
who threw a brick-bat at Chief Justice Richardson in 1631,31 have been
prosecuted by indictment? The dignity of Mr. -Justice Field was tarn-
ished by his handling of the court-room broil in which Terry drew
a weapon.32 The offence was too big, and the pressure on the court's
personal feelings too strong, for the summary punishment to be seemly.
8. Petty disobedience or resistance to process or orders, or inter-
ference with their execution. There should be no feeling that courts
may safely be trifled with. In times when feudal habits of self-help
were still strong, an extensive summary punitive power for interference
with process servers was reasonably deemed desirable. 33  Today the
quality as crime of any serious forcible obstruction of orders or proc-
ess would usually be felt as outweighing its quality as obstruction of
the administration of justice-a fortiori when, as in cases where riotous
outsiders to litigation interfered with the operation of railways by
receivers, the conception of the offence as involving interference with
the administration of justice is highy artificial.34 The question of sum-
mary punishment for violation of labor injunctions involves questions
of policy, too large for this article. It may, however, be noted that
feeling that violation of such injunctions should not be punished save
on conviction by a jury seems to be gaining ground,35 in spite of a
tendency in other fields towards expansion of injunctive enforcement
of criminal law.3 6 Where the true questions are as to the substantive
criminality of conduct-of criminal justice itself, not of obstruction of
"The reversal of contempt convictions in Gridley v. United States, 44 F.
(2d) 716, 742 et seq. (C. C. A. 6th, 1930), might adequately have rested upon the
sole ground that the lower court had unduly magnified its petty contempt power.
'Fox, The Practice in Contempt of Court Cases (1922) 38 L. QuARa. Rxv.
185-6.
MSupra note 10."
'In re Terry's Contempt, 13 Sawy. 440 (C. C. D. Cal. 1888), aff'd, 128 U. S.
289, 9 Sup. Ct. 77 (1888). See also SWlSHER, STEPHEN J. FiEnn (1930) 320-342.
"In 1598 a defendant and his relatives and retainers, resisting service of a
chancery writ, compelled the process server, at dagger's point and with a mastiff
dog, to "eate the labell of the writ. . . . And after the said Henry Parramore
sent for drinke for him, which he cawsed him to drinke with cromes of bread in
the same." Aberforthe v. Hall (40 Eliz.), 1 SANDERS, CHANCERY ORDERS (1845)
76. Such instances explain the special summary severity of Chancery and the Star
Chamber with respect to interference with process servers. See Fox, supra note
4,108-110.
34 Op. cit. supra note 1.
"Michaelson v. United States, 266 U. S. 42, 45 Sup. Ct. 18 (1924).
"For example, under anti-trust, prohibition, criminal syndicalism, and, most
recently, anti-libel statutes. State v. Guilford, 174 Minn. 457, 219 N. W. 770 (1928).
HeinOnline  -- 31 Colum. L. Rev.  965 1931
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
its administration-resort to the summary contempt power is anomalous
and subversive of its nature and principles.
4. Serious obstructions of the administration of justice which
happen not to be punishable under criminal statutes. In jurisdictions
where all contempts are per se subject to prosecution by ordinary
criminal procedure, this class would not exist. In other jurisdictions,
the appearance of an instance should be the signal for enactment of a
criminal statute embracing it. The extent to which the class can reason-
ably be deemed to exist in the Federal courts by reason of the incon-
venience of resort to state criminal courts, or the slackness of state
officials, is a troublesome question. The list of indictable Federal
crimes8 7 may not quite comprehend all serious obstructions of the Fed-
eral administration of justice. When Federal prisoners committed to
the county jail at Chicago were suffered to go at large, there may have
been enough doubt (a) whether the sheriff was indictable under the
Federal Criminal Code and (b) whether state officials would efficiently
have prosecuted him, to justify the imposition of severe summary pun-
ishment.38 With respect to acts such as most contempts by publication,
which courts occasionaly consider serious obstructions of the admin-
istration of justice when sensible laymen and legislatures do not, it
seems obvious that statutory and constitutional immunities from sum-
mary punishment should not be annulled by judicial legislation.8"
The four classes which have been described include, it is believed,
all cases- in which a definitely punitive use of the summary power may
be exercised without arousing grave concern. In other cases the sum-
mary power should reasonably be conceived as exhausted when it has
prevented or cured an obstruction of the administration of justice, and
as having no other legitimate object. Of course there is an inevitable
overlap between prevention and punishment. It may be said that the
object of punitive castigation for petty contempts is preventive. So is
the object of the punishment of crimes, including serious contempts,
by ordinary criminal procedure. What is suggested is this: When the
serious criminality of a contempt is apparent, the most efficient pre-
vention of its recurrence should naturally be by ordinary criminal
prosecution; when that is untrue in fact, the summary power does
'disservice as an inadequate substitute for the correction of inadequacy.
In the light of its principles and policy-having regard also to the
constitutional requisites of jury trial and due process-the summary
power with respect to contempts which are seriously criminal reasonably
3
"Infra note 42.
'United States v. Hoffman, 13 F.(2d) 268 (N. D. Ill. 1925), aff'd, 13 F.(2d)
278 LC. C. A. 7th,- 1926).
See Nelles and King, op. cit. supra note 9.
- 966
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exists only when its exercise may prevent or correct the obstructive ef-
fect of the particular contempt in the particular pending administration
of justice to which it has reference, and only to the extent necessary to
that end. Criminal punishment for serious irreparable harm is for the
ordinary criminal law.
What has been stated is substantially the theory of the limits of
the summary power which a century ago prevailed generally in American
legislation. The legislative movement, though it had an earlier begin-
ning in Pennsylvania, gathered momentum soon after Livingston's publi-
cation. His influence upon the New York Revised Statutes of 1829 is
obvious.40 His work was one of the authorities relied upon by the
draftsmen (James Buchanan and Daniel Webster) of the Federal con-
tempt statute of 1831; and he himself as a member of the Senate doubt-
less promoted that virtually unopposed legislation.41 Both the Federal
and the New York statutes, though in different language, virtually
limited the summary power to misbehavior in the presence of the court,
or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice, and dis-
obedience or resistance to lawful process, orders, etc., and provided that
prosecution for serious obstructions of the administration of justice
should be by ordinary criminal procedure. 42  "It cannot be necessary
at this day," said the New York Revisers, "to urge any reason for
substituting the trial by jury in all possible cases, instead of a trial
by an offended tribunal. '48  The New York and Federal statutes were
the models of most subsequent state legislation ;44 and there is no evi-
dence, unless the proliferation of statutory injunctive remedies for
11 Ibid. at 420-2.
'
1lbid. at 527-531.
' The Federal statute includes "misbehavior of any of the officers of the said
courts in their official transactions," as summarily punishable contempt; the New
York statute omits it. The provisions defining and limiting the summary power
are compared in parallel columns, ibid. at 528-9.
In the New York Revised Statutes of 1829, the limitations of the summary
power and the provisions for "regular" criminal proceedings for serious contempts
were dissociated; see ibid. at 421, note 109. Similar arrangement of substantially
the same provisions, some amplified, is still retained; N. Y. Junc. LAw, §§ 750-781
(summary contempt proceedings), 476-9 (attorneys); N. Y. PENAL LAW, §§ 370-
381 (corruption), 530 (coercion), 580 (conspiracy), 600 (contempt), 810-14 (forg-
ing, destroying, falsifying, suppressing evidence), 860 (intimidation), 1231 et seq.
(jurors), 1620 et seq. (perjury), 1690 et seq. (escape and rescue), 1780 et seq.
(interference with public justice), 2050 et seq. (tampering with records), 2440
et seq. (witnesses) ; and see also 1820 et seq.
The Federal Act of Mar. 2, 1831, c. 98; 4 STAT. 487, had two sections: § 1
(now 28 U. S. C. A. § 385) limiting the summary power; § 2 (now 18 U. S. C. A.
§ 241) making it indictable to obstruct, or endeavour to obstruct, the due adminis-
tration of justice "corruptly, or by threats or force." § 2 has been supplemented by
18 U. S. C. A. §§ 231-251. The detachment of § 2 and its amplifications in the
Revised Statutes and subsequently has caused the supplementary relationship of
the "criminal" provisions to § 1 to be largely forgotten.
' R visms' REPORTS (N. Y. 1828) vol. iv, pt. iii, ch. iii, tit. ii, art. 1, sec. 10.
"Nelles and King, op. cit. supra note 9, at 533-4, 536, n. 45, 534 et seq.
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crimes be deemed such, of any important change of legislative policy
in any statute book.
The same theory that punishment for serious contempts should
be upon conviction by jury has in general prevailed in England without
legislative compulsion. 45 The impropriety of allowing a proper ex-
ercise of summary power to have unnecessary punitive effect was
strongly recognized in the famous case of Maria Annie Davies.40 Mrs.
Davies, defeated in 1877 in litigation in which she claimed title to
property, declined to accept the judgment as concluding her rights. For
nine years thereafter she continued to assert them, sometimes by force,
sometimes by abortive legal proceedings. Enjoined at length from
further assertion, she disobeyed the injunction, and was committed
until she should agree to obey. Her contempt was grossly criminal;
the contumacy of Mr. Gompers in the Bucks Stove and Range Company
case was trifling in comparison. Though after two years' imprison-
ment she was still obdurate, she was released-on the ground (per
Mathew, J. and Mellish, L. J.) that the continuance of summary in-
carceration after it had assumed a punitive character was intolerable.
The dissent of Coleridge, C. J., was on the ground that her imprison-
ment seemed still essential to the efficacy of the court's decree in favor
of her adversary in litigation; he agreed that to punish her was im-
proper.
In this country the attrition by state courts of statutory restrictions
upon punitive use of the summary power has been considerable.4 7 And
the break-down of the Federal statute seems complete, now that it has
been declared that it
"conferred no power not already granted and imposed no limitations not
already existing.""3
'See Gompers case, supra note 25, at 611-612. The influence of Livington's
master, Bentham, was of course consciously felt in England; and Livingston's
own work was there highly regarded; Sir Henry Summer Maine characterized
him as "the first legal genius of modern times." HUNT, LIFE OF EDWARD LivING-
sToN (1864) 135.
"L. R. 21 Q. B. D. 236 (1888).
"It has been closely analyzed only with respect to contempt by publication,
28 COLUMBIA LAW REv. 536-8, 542 et seq.
" Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U. S. 402, 418, 38 Sup. Ct.
560, 564 (1918). For prior tendency towards attrition of the statute with respect
to contempt by publication, see 28 COLUMBIA LAW REv. 532, 539. For the con-
current attrition with respect to tampering with jurors and witnesses, more ex-
cusable in view of the somewhat undue rigor of the intended statutory limitation
With respect to such contempts, see the cases cited infra notes 54 and 55. That
the statutory intention was that the summary power (save as to misconduct of
officers of court and disobedience or resistance to writs, orders, etc.) should extend
only to obstructive acts committed in close topographical propinquity to a sitting
court can scarcely be doubted. See citations supra note 42. The draftsmen felt a
need of subjecting the courts to a limitation more definite and unequivocal than
the abstract principle that the power may not be used punitively.
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But since, notwithstanding numerous and striking deviations, usage
still for the most part conforms with feeling, sometimes expressed,4 9
that definitely punitive use of, the summary power is not within its
illimitable "inherent" scope, it may not be futile to hope that the fre-
quency of such use will diminish.
III. SOME INSTANCES OF REGARD AND DISREGARD FOR THE
PRINCIPLES OF THE POWER
The proper object of the power as here conceived may be re-stated
as to bring about specific performance of legal duties incident to litiga-
tion-duties mainly of judges, jurors, parties, and witnesses. The
power may reach the person who seeks to prevent another's perform-
ance of duty as well as the person upon whom the duty directly lies.
The ultimate concern, as in law generally, is for justice; but the power
enforces directly not justice but its due administration. This distinc-
tion, however, though clarifying, is not water-tight. A juror's duty,
for example, is not simply to decide, but to decide fairly; a witness's
is to tell the truth. And insofar as the summary power can contribute
to secure faithful as well as formal performance of legal duty, without
disregard of limiting principles, it is clearly desirable that it do so,
serving justice itself as well as its machinery.
Perjury
The proper limits of the power with respect to perjury, long ob-
scured in a cloud of loose decisions, have latterly tended to become
clear. It would be intolerable that witnesses should testify in fear
of summary punishment if they should seem to testify falsely. That
would indeed make the contempt power a "legal thumbscrew"; an
honest witness would be in danger of committal until he should testify
in a way which the court deemed truthful.5 But the power can under-
take a little more than to compel witnesses to answer questions some-
how. In an illuminating case, a witness who "blocked inquiry" by per-
sistent and manifestly perjured evasion of disclosure as to a matter
surely within his knowledge was committed for ten days. "At the end
of that time," said Judge Learned Hand, "he may appear before the
commissioner and see whether he can tell a story which is not so ob-
viously a mere sham."5' The court did not, however, conceive that it
'Supra note 24.
'Ex parte Hudgings, supra note 17, holding that the District Court had iw
jurisdiction to commit a witness for falsely insisting that he had no recollection of
ever having seen certain persons write; the witness was discharged on habeas
corpus, his committal having been "without due process of law."
"'United States v. Appel, 211 Fed. 495 (S. D. N. Y. 1913), approved in Ex
parte Hudgings, supra note 17, at 383.
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could undertake either to extort the truth, or to punish for falsehood.
It might be rash to say that no perjury which is not assimilable
to recalcitrancy may properly be dealt with summarily. But in other
adjudicated instances the "necessity" or paramount expediency of sum-
mary committal is not always apparent. It is true, as was said in one
such case, that "there is no essential difference" between obstructing the
administration of justice by perjured evidence and by tampering with
a juror or witness. 52  The assumption, however, that either tampering
or perjury is ipso facto punishable summarily quite ignores the limits
implicit in the principles of the power.
Tampering with Jurors or Witnesses
With respect to tampering, adjudication is still cloudy. On the
face of most of the cases it would seem that the criminality of tamper-
ing was the reason it was summarily punishable.5 3
Tampering with jurors ranges all the way from bribery and in-
timidation to the sort of undue influence which, however prejudicial,
cannot practically be eliminated. A degree of friendly or unfriendly
feeling on the part of jurors-and judges also-towards litigants and
counsel is inevitably incident to a trial, and often affects its result.
Deliberate "flirtation" with the jury is a branch of the art of a trial
lawyer; it becomes contempt only when it is maladroit. Though it would
rarely be deemed contemptuous to satisfy a juror's desire for a cigarette
in the corridor during recess, social overtures which pass the vague line
between common courtesy and affirmative ingratiation may well call for
reprimand or punishment. Punishment for such a thing, even after the
trial is over, would be within the "petty offence" power which has been
conceded on perhaps illogical grounds of practical convenience. Im-
proprieties which are possibly, even though not certainly, prejudicial
should not be committed with impunity.
When tampering amounts to a serious crime, if a summary punish-
ment will prevent prevention of a juror's faithful specific performance
of his duty-for instance, by removing an intimidatory or corrupting
pressure before it has done harm54-its imposition is clearly within the
'I re Steiner, 195 Fed. 299, 303 (S. D. N. Y. 1912).
' See, e.g., Kelly v. United States, 250 Fed. 947 (C. C. A. 9th, 1918) and cases
there cited.
"This ground was taken in 1 re Brule, 71 Fed. 943, 946 (D. Nev. 1895). It
was seemingly available in Savin, Petitioner, 131 U. S. 267, 9 Sup. Ct. 699 (1889)
and Cuddy, Petitioner, 131 U. S. 280, 9 Sup. Ct. 703 (1889). Those cases, how-
ever, devoted their argument to the statutory question, then still important, of
whether the place of the offense was topographically near enough to the sitting
court. The concentration of attention upon the over-rigorousness, in some cases, of
this attempted limitation of the contempt power may be responsible for inattention,
in cases only superficially similar (infra note 55), to the limits inherent in the prin-
ciples of the power.
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principles of the power. But if the obstruction of the administration
of justice has become an accomplished and irreparable fact-as when
a juror has been bribed-is there any theoretically admissible reason
why the offence should not be remitted to "regular" criminal proceed-
ings? Yet a number of cases sustain summary punishments for tam-
pering with witnesses or jurors when no ground for proceeding sum-
marily is either apparent from the facts or stated in the opinion.55 And
the recent case of Sinclair v. United States56 seems calculated to give
wings to their encroaching tendency.
In that case the obstruction of the administration of justice by
undue surveillance of jurors empanelled to try Messrs. Sinclair and
Fall for conspiracy to defraud the government of oil reserves was no
longer preventable or correctible. It had been accomplished. A mis-
trial had been declared on Nov. 2, 1927l. The "summary" proceedings
were instituted thereafter on Nov. 22. The "summary" trial lasted
from Dec. 5, 1927 to Feb. 21, 1928. A record of eight hundred and
seventy-eight printed pages was filed in the Supreme Court a year later.
In that court the question mainly considered was whether the defend-
ants were in fact guilty of criminally obstructing the administration of
justice. The court could discover, it said, "no reason for emasculating
the power of courts to protect themselves against this odious thing,"
assuming without discussion an identity of area of summary and regular
proceedings for crimes against the administration of justice.57 It ignored
-the defendants' counsel had discreetly omitted to raise the point-
the absence of any acknowledgable reason why the interest in securing
"trial by capable juries in important cases" generally would not have
been adequately served by a regular criminal prosecution. It is not
easy to see how the interest in trial by jury is served by dispensing with
juries in cases appropriate for them.
The Sinclair indictment was still of course technically "pending"
after the mistrial. But can a candid mind believe that the summary
punishment for tampering was in fact directed towards securing a due
administration of justice in a re-trial of the indictment? It seems ob-
vious that fear of failure of justice in jury trials either for the oil
conspiracy or the tampering was an operative unacknowledged reason
for the "summary" punishment for contempt. In that respect the
In re May, 1 Fed. 737 (E. D. Mich. 1880), McCaully v. United States, 25
App. D. C. 404 (1905); Keeney v. United States, 17 F.(2d) 976 (C. C. A. 7th,
1927). In these cases the harm was done before summary proceedings were in-
stituted.
M279 U. S. 749, 49 Sup. Ct. 471 (1929).
17 Ibid. at 765. The facts, unless construed with artificial narrowness, con-
stituted an offence of "corruptly endeavoring to influence or obstruct the due admin-
istration of justice," indictable under 18 U. S. C. A. § 241.
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Sinclair contempt case is not unique. Such a fear, however, would
equally justify summary punishment for murder.r8 In no case noted
has it been openly avowed as a ground for proceeding summarily. In
one case a district attorney argued that a summary conviction should be
sustained because of doubt whether an influential defendant could be
convicted by a jury. "This amounts," said Judge G. W. Anderson, "to
urging usurpation of jurisdiction in order to achieve a conviction thought
impossible under the forms of law provided by Congress."' 0
' And may indeed be felt to have done so. Ex parte Wall, 107 U. S. 265, 2
Sup. Ct. 569 (1882); United States v. Shipp, (on demurrer) 203 U. S. 563, 27
Sup. Ct. 165 (1906) ; (on the merits) 214 U. S. 386, 29 Sup. Ct. 637 (1909).
In the Shipp case a negro had been convicted of rape by a Tennessee court,
and sentenced to death. A Federal District Judge having denied his application for
habeas corpus, an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States was allowed,
staying execution of the death sentence which would otherwise have occurred on
the day following. A mob, stimulated by publication of the action of the Supreme
Court, lynched the negro in the evening of the day that the appeal was allowed.
There had been attempts to lynch him before his conviction.
The county sheriff (for non-prevention doubtfully amounting to collusion)
and several active lynchers were punished for contempt of the Supreme Court.
The case is clear to the effect that contumacious purpose to defeat that court'sjurisdiction of the negro was the essence of the contempt. Cf. note 23, supra. It
would seem that a lynching motived solely by animus against the negro for his
alleged crime would not have been contemptuous.
The active lynchers were surely guilty of a gross criminal contempt-an
obstruction, by force, of the due administration of justice in the Supreme Court
-clearly subject to "regular" criminal prosecution under what was originally § 2
of the contempt statute of 1831. See note 42, supra. The completeness and
irreparableness of the obstruction are obvious. If, in the view here taken, there
was justification for the summary punishment (which was by the Supreme Court
itself, as an exercise of original jurisdiction), it must be found in the practical
certainty that it would have been as impossible to convict the lynchers of contempt
by jury trial in a Federal court in Tennessee as to convict them of murder in a
state court. The question of the desirability of law enforcement when it is in-
tolerable to the community it is supposed to serve is in this instance complicated.
For it may be said that the enforcement of Federal law, desired by the people of
the United States generally, should not be subject to defeat by merely local pas-
sions. Yet the lynching itself was theoretically of no possible Federal interest.
It was nevertheless so clearly likely to be the real object of punishment that the
use of the summary power may excite as much concern as approval.
Concern is greater in the case of the sheriff (Shipp) than in the case of the
actual active lynchers. For the Supreme Court divided five to three on the question
of his contumacy. It seems clear that that question would better have been remitted
to a jury.
'Coll v. United States, 8 F. (2d) 20, 22 (C. C. A. 1st, 1925). This is unique
among recent cases in giving effect to the clear intention of the Federal statute
that tampering, when it is geographically remote from a sitting court, should not
be summarily dealt with. Supra notes 42 and 48. The facts disclose a better
reason than the physical remoteness of Dr. Coll's activities for reversing his
summary conviction. Dr. Coll had been indicted with others for conspiracy to
violate the Prohibition Act, on testimony by an acknowledged bootlegger who was
himself under indictment, given in return for a promise of immunity from the dis-
trict attorney. Dr. Coll's alleged contempt was an interview with the bootlegger
at his house, four miles from court. According to Dr. Coll's witnesses the boot-
legger then admitted that he had testified falsely against Dr. Coll before the
grand jury "in order to get himself free from his own criminal troubles." The
prosecution introduced evidence-"very doubtful evidence" in Judge Anderson's
opinion-that Dr. Coll obtained the bootlegger's retraction by intimidation and
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IV. IMPLICATIONS
In a short view of summary punishments for serious crimes, sat-
isfaction may be felt that a degree of retributive justice was somehow
visited upon persons generally believed capable of defeating justice in
a jury trial. But is not such "justice" closer to mob law than to due
process of law? I'hless we are to acknowledge that influential persons
cannot be convicted by juries, and acquiesce in reversion to the sort of
conditions which the Tudor autocracy developed the Chancery and the
Star Chamber to control-the law of the land being impotent with re-
spect to the "over-mighty subject" 6° -it is inappropriate to permit the
contempt power to advance toward superseding the due administration
of justice which it exists to protect. It results from that advance that
when we look at the boundary of the contempt power, instead of finding
a penumbra as wide only as the variations of careful judgment on ques-
tions of the necessity of summary procedure in doubtful cases, we find
it scalloped with strong protrusions into a" clearly alien area, so that it
seems that a familiar maxim may have to be revised to read, cessante
ratione, non obstante progressat lex.
It is notorious that justice increasingly fails of effectuation
through due process of law in criminal cases. It is natural to ascribe
much of the blame to the inefficiency of trial by jury. But that ineffi-
ciency is but one of many surface symptoms of the real cause-a condi-
tion of society in which the will that justice should fail is often more
powerful than the will that justice-should prevail. Since, in cases where
the will that justice should win is insufficient, the administration of
justice by straight foot-ball is ineffectual, law-abiding emotion tends
to condone, and even approve, resort by justice to trick plays for an
occasional score-as when a gangster, practically secure from prosecu-
tion for major crimes, is convicted for not paying taxes upon his nefar-
ious income. Approval of summary punishments for grave criminality
is similarly short-sighted. Efficient justice through juries depends upon
an intense and general desire for it in society at large. So also, how-
ever, does efficient justice through courts sitting without juries. The
traditional attachment to trial by jury is supported by abundant evi-
suggestions of benefits. Dr. Coil's own emissary brought the interview to the
attention of the district attorney in connection with an application for discon-
tinuance of the prosecution of the indictment against Dr. Coll. The response to
this application was the information against Dr. Coll for contempt.
The substantial non-technical ground for reversing Dr. Coil's conviction for
contempt was doubt whether he was in fact guilty of obstructing the administra-
tion of justice. Perhaps the real obstruction occurred when the bootlegger was
induced to give evidence against him before the grand jury-and the effect of
Dr. Coll's pressure on the bootlegger was to remove it. The question called loudly
for jury trial.
1 HoLDSWoRTH, HIsT. ENG. LAW (3d ed. 1923) chs. v, vi.
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dence that the degree by which judges are more remote than juries from
pressures of ordinary feeling is apt to result in injustice.0 ' A substitu-
tion in general of summary for "regular" criminal procedure--the logi-
cal implication of approval of encroachments through the contempt
power-might be a jump from frying-pan to fire.
It may seem reactionary to press for limitation of judicial power
by conventional principles at a time when the cry is for its relief from
the clutter of "theology" and "ritual" which both obscures actual
grounds of decision and impedes recognition of desirable grounds.0 2 In
that cry I somewhat join-with unqualified enthusiasm for the penetrat-
ing analysis of legal phenomena upon which it is premised. But, as
the Sinclair case illustrates, alongside of questions of justice in partic-
ular cases is the question of judicial power, which, like all other power,
is of an encroaching nature and needs checks. I cannot feel that it has
so completely rid itself of restraint by principles that all principles may
as well be scrapped as worthless. Some principles, including those of
the contempt power, are still, though unevenly, efficacious.
WALTER NELLES
YALE LAW SCHOOL
'Witness, for safety in the uncontroversial past, the Star Chamber, and the
judicial views which Erskine persuaded juries to overrule. Dean Green, for all
his condemnation of trial by jury, recognizes that juries did important service to
legal science by declining to follow artificial rules of law in negligence cases.
JUDGE AND JURY (1930) 122.
' GREEN, op. cit. supra note 61. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND
(1930).
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